Abstract. We analyze the performance of single-parameter mechanisms for markets in which there is competition amongst both consumers and suppliers (namely, two-sided markets). Specifically, we examine the proportional allocation mechanism for two-sided markets. This mechanism is the natural generalization of both Kelly's proportional allocation mechanism for demand-competitive markets [8] and Johari and Tsitsiklis' proportional allocation mechanism for supply-competitive markets [7] .
Introduction
How to produce and allocate scarce resources is the most fundamental question in economics. 1 The standard tool for guiding production and allocation is a pricing mechanism. However, different mechanisms will have different performance attributes: no two mechanisms are equal. Of particular interest to computer scientists is the fact that there will typically be an inherent trade-off between the economic efficiency of a mechanism (measured in terms of social welfare) and its computational efficiency (both time and communication complexity). Socially optimal allocations can be achieved using pricing mechanisms based on classical VCG results, but implementing such mechanisms generally induces excessively high informational and computational costs [15] . In this paper, we study this tradeoff from the opposite viewpoint: we examine the level of social welfare that can be achieved by mechanisms performing minimal amounts of computation. In particular, we restrict our attention to so-called scalar-parametrized pricing mechanisms. Each participant submits only a single scalar bid that is used to set a unique market-clearing price for each good. Evidently, such mechanisms are computationally trivial to handle; more surprisingly, they can produce high welfare.
The chief practical motivation for considering scalar-parametrized mechanisms (both in our work and in the existing literature) is the problem of bandwidth sharing. Namely, how should we allocate capacity amongst users that want to transmit data over a network link? The use of market mechanisms for this task has been studied in Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks [18] and the Internet [17] . In fact, the Internet is made up of smaller interconnected networks that buy capacities from each other. Physical connections are formed in central clearing houses, called internet exchanges, which act as marketplaces for bandwidth. Indeed, the market mechanisms we consider are closely inspired by the structure of the Internet. Specifically, we would like our solutions to be scalable to very large networks. This requirement for scalability forces us consider only simple mechanisms, such as those that set a unique market clearing price. The computational requirements of more complex systems, e.g. mechanisms that perform price discrimination, become impractical on large networks [1] .
We remark that unique price mechanisms are also intuitively "fair", as every participant is treated equally. This fairness is appealing from a social and political perspective, and indeed these systems are used in many real-world settings, such as electricity markets [19] .
Background and Previous Work.
A basic method for resource allocation is the proportional allocation mechanism of Kelly [8] . In the context of networks, it operates as follows: each potential consumer submits a bid b q ; bandwidth is then allocated to the consumers in proportion to their bids. This simple idea has also been studied within economics by Shapley and Shubik [16] as a model for understanding pricing in market economies. In a groundbreaking result, Johari and Tsitsiklis [5] showed that the welfare loss incurred by this mechanism is at most 25% of optimal.
Observe that Kelly's is a scalar-paramterized mechanism for a one-sided market: every participant is a consumer. Johari and Tsitsiklis [7] also examined one-sided markets with supply-side competition only. There, under a corresponding single-parameter mechanism, the welfare loss tends to zero as the level of competition increases. We remark that we cannot simply analyse supply-side competition by trying to model suppliers as demand-side consumers [3] .
Of course, competition in markets typically occurs on both sides. Consequently, understanding the efficiency of two-sided market 2 mechanisms is important problem.
In this work, we analyze the price of anarchy in a mechanism for a two-sided market in which consumers and producers compete simultaneously to determine the production and allocation of goods. This mechanism was first proposed by Neumayer [11] and is the natural generalization of both the demand-side model of Kelly [8] and the supply-side model of Johari and Tsitsiklis [7] .
In order to examine how the generalized proportional allocation mechanism performs in a twoside market, it is important to note that there are three primary causes of welfare loss. First, the underlying allocation problem may be computationally hard. Secondly, even if the allocation problem is computationally simple, the mechanism itself may still be insufficiently sophisticated to solve it. Thirdly, the mechanism may be susceptible to gaming; namely, the mechanism may incentivize selfish agents to behave in a manner that produces a poor overall outcome. As we will see in Section 3, the first two causes do not arise here: the proportional allocation mechanism can quickly find optimal allocations in two-sided markets. Thus, we are concerned only with the third factor: how adversely is the proportional allocation mechanism affected by gaming agents? That is, the mechanism may be capable of producing an optimal solution, but how will the agents' selfish behaviour affect social welfare at the resultant equilibria?
In this paper we prove the proportional allocation mechanisms does perform well in two-sided markets. Specifically, in quite general settings, the mechanism provides a constant factor welfare ratio (that is, a constant factor price of anarchy guarantee). Moreover, we will show that there is large family of mechanisms among which ours uniquely achieves the best possible price of anarchy guarantee. We state our exact results, in Section 2.4, after we have described the model and our assumptions.
The Model

2.1.
The two-sided proportional allocation mechanism. Here, we formally present the two-sided proportional allocation mechanism due to Neumayer [11] . There are Q consumers and R suppliers. Each consumer q has a valuation function V q (d q ), where d q represents the user's allocation, and each supplier r has a cost function C r (s r ), where s r is the supplier's production quota. The consumers and suppliers respectively input bids b q and b r to the mechanism. By doing so, consumers are implicitly selecting a b q -parametrized demand function of the form D(b q , p) = A high bid by a consumer indicates a high willingness to pay for the product, and a low bid by a supplier indicates a high willingness to supply (alternatively, a high bid indicates a high cost supplier). The actual choice of constant used for the supply functions does not affect our results, and so we choose it to be 1.
Observe that the parametrized demand functions are identical to the ones in the demand-side mechanism of Kelly [8] , and the supply functions are identical to the ones in the supply-side mechanism of Johari and Tsitsiklis [7] . The peculiar form of the supply functions comes from the interesting fact that for most scalar-parametrized mechanisms, in order to have a non-zero welfare ratio, the supply functions have to be bounded from above. In other words, suppliers' strategies must necessarily be constrained in order to obtain high welfare; see Appendix J for the precise statement of this fact. This rules out, for instance, Cournot-style mechanisms where suppliers directly submit the quantities they wish to produce.
More detailed justifications for this choice of model can be found in [11] , as well as in [8] and [7] . Further justification for the mechanism will be provided by our results. Specifically, the proportional allocation mechanism generally produces high welfare solutions and, in addition, it is the optimal mechanism amongst a class of single-parameter mechanisms for two-sided markets.
Given the bids, the mechanism sets a price p(b) that clears the market; i.e. that satisfies
The price therefore gets set to p(b) = P q bq+ P r br R . Consumer q then receives d q units of the resource, and pays pd q , while supplier r produces s r units and receives a payment of ps r . In the game induced by this mechanism, the payoff (or utility) to consumer q placing a bid b q is then defined to be
and the payoff to supplier r placing a bid b r is defined as
2.2. The Welfare Ratio. The social welfare produced by the mechanism on bids b is defined as
If the agents act as "price-takers", we show in Section 3 that the mechanism maximizes social welfare. However, since the price is a function of their bid, each agent is a "price-maker". If agents attempt to exploit this market power then a welfare loss may occur at a Nash equilibrium. Consequently we are interested in maximizing (over all equilibria) the welfare ratio more commonly known as the price of anarchy,
Equivalently, we wish to minimize the welfare loss, 1 −
Assumptions. We make the following assumption on the valuation and cost functions. Assumption 1. For each consumer q, the valuation function V q (d q ) : R + → R + is strictly increasing and concave. For each supplier r, the cost function C r (s r ) : R + → R + is strictly increasing and convex.
Assumption 1 corresponds to decreasing marginal valuations and increasing marginal costs. The assumption is standard in the literature. It certainly may not hold in every market 3 , but without it there will be a natural incentive for the number of agents to decline on both sides of the market. In this paper, we will also assume that our functions are differentiable over their entire domain; this property is assumed primarily for clarity and is not essential.
Assumption 1, however, is not sufficient to ensure a large welfare ratio (small welfare loss). In fact, the welfare ratio depends upon the curvature of the marginal cost functions. Specifically, if the marginal cost functions are convex, then we show, in Section 3, that the welfare ratio is at least 0.58. For concave marginal cost functions, we obtain constant welfare ratios, provided the cost function is sufficiently non-linear; see Section 4. As the marginal cost functions tend to constants, the welfare ratio tends to zero; an example of this is given in Appendix E (see Neumayer [11] for another example).
Our main result concerns convex marginal cost functions. Formally, for most of the paper, we assume that Assumption 2. For each supplier r, the marginal cost function C r (s r ) is convex. Furthermore, we assume that C r (0) = C r (0) = 0.
Convex marginal cost functions (for example, as often occur with quadratic or higher degree polynomial functions) are extremely common in both the theoretical and the practical literature on industrial theory [20] , so this assumption is not particularly restrictive. As noted, though, we may also obtain good guarantees for concave marginal cost functions. In Assumption 2 we also set C r (0) = 0 but, as we show in Appendix D, constant welfare ratios still arise whenever C r (0) is bounded below one (it cannot be higher than one or the firm is uncompetitive). Finally, we remark that Assumption 2 was also used in Johari, Mannor and Tsitsiklis [4] .
2.4. Our Results. In this paper we prove that: Theorem 1. A competitive equilibrium exists for the two-sided proportional allocation mechanism and it optimizes social welfare.
Theorem 2. The mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium for R ≥ 2.
Given Assumption 2, our main result is:
3 For example, in markets exhibiting economies of scale.
Theorem 3. The worst case welfare ratio for the mechanism involving R ≥ 2 suppliers equals
(R − 1)(R − 1 + 2s) where s is the unique positive root of the quartic polynomial
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
This shows us that the mechanism gives a constant factor welfare ratio. Moreover, it allows us to examine how the level of competition in the markets affects welfare. Specifically, we find Corollary 4. The worst case welfare ratio occurs for a duopoly (R = 2) and is 0.588727.
Corollary 5.
If the supply side is fully competitive (R → ∞) the welfare ratio is 0.64.
Consequently, as supply-side competition increases, the welfare ratio improves. Surprisingly, the welfare ratio decreases as demand-side competition increases. The best welfare ratios arise when there is only one consumer (Q = 1), that is, in the case of a monopsony. For example, we obtain Theorem 6. For a monopsonist facing a fully competitive supply-side the welfare ratio is 0.718.
Recall that for a fixed demand welfare loss tends to zero when the supply side is fully competitive [7] . In contrast, no such result holds in two-sided markets. This follows as in two-sidedmarkets the situation most closely corresponding to a fixed demand is that of a monopsony, but Theorem 6 tells us that there can then be welfare losses.
Removing Assumption 2, the welfare ratio is zero for linear cost functions. The rate at which the welfare ratio tends to zero for concave marginal cost functions is illustrated by a class of polynomial cost functions with degree 1 + 1 d that give a constant welfare ratio for any fixed d.
Theorem 7.
The welfare ratio for cost functions C r (s r ) = cx
The two-sided market for a single resource can be generalized to the case of multiple resources. An important multi-resource setting is that of bandwidth shared on a network of links. A network version of our market can be defined, as can more general multi-resource markets (see Appendix G) and our welfare guarantees still apply.
Theorem 8. The welfare ratio in networks equals that of the single-resource model. Theorem 9. The welfare guarantees hold for more general multi-resource markets.
Finally, we show that the proportional allocation mechanism is optimal in the following way:
Theorem 10. In two-sided markets, the proportional allocation mechanism provides the best welfare ratio amongst a class of single-parameter market-clearing mechanisms.
Our proof techniques are inspired by the approaches and techniques developed to analyze single-sided markets by Johari [3] , Johari and Tsitsiklis ( [5] , [6] and [7] ), Johari, Mannor and Tsitsiklis [4] , and Roughgarden [14] . Due to space limitations, most of our results will be deferred to the appendices. Here, in the main text, we will focus upon the proof of Theorem 3.
Optimization in Eight Steps
The proof of the main result, Theorem 3, is presented below in eight steps. We formulate the efficiency loss problem as an optimization program in Step III. To be able to formulate this we first need to understand the structure of optimal solutions and of equilibria under this mechanism. This we do in Steps I and II, where we give necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal solutions and for equilibrium. (Moreover, there is always a unique equilibrium provided the supply market is not a monopoly.) This leads us to an optimization problem that initially appears slightly formidable, so we then attempt to simplify it. In Steps IV and V, we show how to simplify (eliminate) the demand constraints in the program. Then in Steps VI and VII, we simplify (eliminate) the supply constraints in the program. This produces an optimization program in a form more amenable to quantitive analysis; we perform this analysis in Step VIII.
Step I: Optimality Conditions. The best possible allocation is the solution to the system:
Since the constraints are linear, there exists an optimal solution at which the Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions hold. (The solution is optimal because the objective function is concave, the first order conditions are thus sufficient.) These conditions imply that
where λ is the dual variable corresponding to the equality constraint. We remark that a competitive equilibria, where the agents act as price-takers with respect to the mechanism, exists and maximizes social welfare. A proof of this (that is, of Theorem 1) is given in Appendix C.
Of course, agents are clearly price-makers under this mechanism, so competitive equilibria are not our focus. Consequently, our goal now is to understand equilibria given this fact.
Step II: Equilibria Conditions. Here we describe necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bids b to form Nash equilibrium.
First, observe that there must be at least two suppliers, that is R ≥ 2. If not, then we have a monopolist k whose payoff is is strictly increasing in b k . Specifically,
Next, we show that if b is a Nash equilibrium, then at least two bids must be positive. Suppose for a contradiction that we have a supplier k and r =k b r = q b q = 0. Then
For the second expression, we used the fact that C k (x) = 0 for any x ≤ 0. Observe that if b k = 0 then the firm can profitably deviate by increasing b k infinitesimally; on the other hand, if b k > 0 then the firm should infinitesimally decrease b k . Thus, there is no equilibrium in which either all bids are zero, or a single supplier is the only agent to make a positive bid. Thus there must be at least two positive bids at equilibrium.
Since at least two bids are positive, the payoffs Π k are differentiable and concave, and the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. For the suppliers,
Moreover, if there are at least two suppliers then there is a unique Nash equilibrium. A proof of this (that is, of Theorem 2) is given in Appendix D.
Step III: An optimization problem. We can now formulate the welfare ratio as an optimization problem.
Given the cost and valuation functions, the constraints (2)-(6) are necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium by Step II, and constraints (7)- (11) are the optimality conditions from Step I. We now want to find the worst-case cost and valuation functions for the mechanism.
Step IV: Linear Valuation Functions. To evaluate this intimidating looking program we attempt to simplify it. First, efficiency loss is worst when each consumer has a linear valuation function. This is simple to show using a standard trick (see, for example, [5] ). Thus, we restrict ourselves to linear functions of the form V q (d q ) = α q d q . Without loss of generality, we may assume that α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ ... ≥ α Q and that max q α q = 1 after we normalize the functions by 1/ max q α q . Observe that this implies that d OP T Step V: Eliminating the Demand Constraints. In this step, we describe how to eliminate the demand constraints from the program. First we show that we can transform constraint (14) into 0 ≤ p < 1. Since α q ≤ 1, ∀q, we see that constraint (2) implies that p ≤ 1. Furthermore, if p = 1, then (2) can never be satisfied, and so we must have d N E q = 0, ∀q. The supply equals demand constraint (6) then gives s N E r = 0, ∀r. This gives a contradiction as the resulting allocation is not a Nash equilibrium: any supplier can increase its profits by providing a bid slightly smaller than p (remember that C r (0) = 0 by Assumption 2). Thus p < 1. This, in turn,
= 0 then (3) cannot be satisfied for q = 1. Consequently, constraints (2) and (3) must hold with equality for q = 1. In fact, without loss of generality, constraints (2) and (3) hold with equality for q > 1. If constraint (2) does not hold with equality, we can reduce α q , and this does not increase the value of the objective function. If d N E q = 0 and constraint (3) does not hold with equality, we can set α q = p and the objective function will be unaffected. So,
for all q. Substituting into the objective function:
Now, observe that the objective function is convex and symmetric in the variables d 2 , ..., d Q , when all the other variables are held fixed. Convexity holds because our function is a sum of (6), (12) and (13) . Therefore, for any given fixed assignment to the other variables, we must have
. Otherwise, we could reshuffle the variable labels and obtain a second minimum, which is impossible by the convexity of the objective function. So, after replacing every
. After inserting constraint (16) and the new constraint (19) , the numerator of the objective function (15) becomes
where we have replaced the function x(p, s, d 1 ) by an ordinary variable x for simplicity. Finally, observe that if we increase Q by one, the objective function (1) cannot increase, since we can set d Q+1 = 0 and at least keep the same objective function value as before. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can take the limit as Q → ∞. 4 Note that this only changes the objective function, as all the constraints that contained Q have been inserted into the function and can be eliminated. After these changes, the optimization problem becomes
Hence, we have achieved our goal and completely eliminated the demand side of the optimization problem. Specifically, all the demand constraints have been replaced with an expression that is a function of the supply-side allocation. Now we must find the worst such allocation.
Step VI: Linear Marginal Cost Functions We will now show that, in searching for a worst case allocation, we can restrict our attention to linear marginal cost functions of the form C r (s r ) = β r s r where β r > 0. We do this by exhibiting, for any family of cost functions C r (s r ), r ∈ R, two new familiesĈ r () andC r () with the property that the C r have a better performance ratio than theC r which, in turn, have a a better performance ratio than theĈ r Furthermore, theĈ r will be a family with linear marginal costs, as desired. The cost functions are defined as
where s N E r is the Nash equilibrium allocation to supplier r when the cost functions are C r (s r ). Observe that the s N E r still satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions (27) and (28) for both the new cost functionsC r andĈ r . Thuss N E r =ŝ N E r = s N E r ; consequently, the efficiency at the Nash equilibrium is identical in all three cases.
We will now show that the performance ratio for theC r is better than for the C r . In particular, the optimal solution can only get better in the former case. To see this, observe that by the convexity of C r (s r ), we have C r (s r ) ≥C r (s r ) for s r ≥ s N E r . Thus
(wheres OP T r is the optimal allocation to supplier r when the cost functions areC r ). So our goal now is to show that usingĈ r is not better than usingC r . Before doing that, we'll need to establish some results. First, observe that we must have s ≥ C r (s N E r ). Here the equality holds by (29) and (30), the first inequality follows from (31) and (32), and the second one follows from (27). Since the marginal costs are strictly increasing, our claim holds.
By convexity,Ĉ r (s r ) ≥C r (s r ) for 0 ≤ s r ≤s N E r . Thus ∆ r :=Ĉ r (ŝ N E r ) −C r (ŝ N E r ) ≥ 0; note that ∆ r is exactly the area on the graph betweenĈ r and C r on the interval [0,
=ŝ N E r , we have
To see the equality, recall thats OP T r >s N E r . Then, becauseC r (s r ) =Ĉ r (s r ) in the range s r ≥ s N E r , it follows thats OP T r =ŝ OP T r . For s r ≥ŝ N E r , we also haveĈ r (s r ) =C r (s r ) + ∆ r . Thus, the performance ratio of theĈ r is at most that of the C r .
Step VII: Eliminating the Supply Constraints. Assuming linear marginal cost functions, the optimization problem (26)-(32) becomes
with the new variables β r , r = 1, ..., R. From s OP T r ≥ s N E r , we can then deduce that (34) and (35) hold with equality. Suppose they don't for some r. Then
will be a feasible solution (i.e. constraint (36) will still be satisfied). Furthermore, increasing β r to p 1+1/(R−1) will only decrease the objective function since this is equivalent to subtracting a positive number from the numerator and the denominator. We can further simplify the system by replacing constraints (36) and (37) with s OP T r = min(1/β r , 1). It is easy to see that s OP T r and β r satisfy the equation above if and only if they satisfy (36) and (37). The reduced optimization problem now becomes:
s. t.
We can insert the equality constraints (42) and (43) into the objective function (41) to obtain:
The objective function (47) can be rewritten as:
Consequently, the minimum of the optimization problem (47)- (50) is greater than or equal to
We have now reduced the system (33)-(40) to a two-dimensional minimization problem. The next step is to try to explicitly find the minimum.
Step VIII: Computing the Worst Case Welfare Ratio.
To obtain Theorem 3 we need to solve the optimization problem (51)-(53) with R as a parameter. We show how to do this in Appendix C. Thus we have proved our main result. It has several ramifications. Firstly, the worst case welfare ratio occurs with duopolies, that is when R = 2. There we obtain s = 0.566812 · · · which gives a worst case welfare ratio of 0.588727 · · · . Moreover, observe that this bound is tight. Our proof is essentially constructive; costs and valuations can be defined to to create an instance that produces the bound. Secondly, the welfare ratio improves as the number of supplies increases. Specifically as R → ∞, the bound tends to So, as supply-side competition increases, the welfare ratio does improves. The opposite occurs as demand-side competition increases. Specifically, adapting our approach gives Theorem 6.
Concave Marginal Cost Functions.
The welfare ratio tends to zero if the cost function is linear, that is if the marginal cost function is a constant; for an example see Appendix E. We can get some idea of how the welfare ratio tends to zero for concave marginal cost functions by considering a class of polynomial cost functions with degree 1 + 
Extensions to Networks and Arbitrary Markets.
So we can analyze two-sided markets for bandwidth on a single-link network. We can generalize these results to the case where bandwidth is shared over an entire network of links. Here agents can buy and sell bandwidth on numerous links. Each consumer q is associated with a source-sink pair and its payoff is a function of the maximum (s q , t q )-flow it can obtain using the bandwidth it has purchased in the network. The welfare guarantees for the network model are the same as for the single-link case. A formal description of the network model and a proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix G. Moreover, if we identify links e ∈ E with arbitrary resources, then our results apply to a general class of markets with any number of resources. The exact definition of these markets and a proof of Theorem 9 are also given in Appendix G.
Smooth Market-Clearing Mechanisms
It was shown in [3] and [6] that in single-sided markets, the proportional allocation mechanism uniquely achieves the best possible welfare ratio within a broad class of so-called smooth marketclearing mechanisms. This family has a natural extension to the case of two-sided mechanisms, and we show that, given a symmetry condition, the two-sided proportional allocation mechanism is optimal amongst that class of single-parameter mechanisms. A description of smooth marketclearing mechanisms and a proof of Theorem 10 is given in Appendix H. Here we prove Theorem 1; that is, we show that a competitive equilibrium exist and achieves maximum welfare. A pair (b, p) where b ≥ 0 and p > 0 is a called a competitive equilibrium if:
, in a competitive equilibrium, the agents are maximizing their payoffs under the assumption that they are price-takers. We will show that the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the demand and supply allocations (d, s) induced by (b, p) form a competitive equilibrium are identical to the conditions under which (d, s) is an optimal solution to (OPT).
We have already found the optimality conditions in Section 3. So let's calculate the required conditions for a competitive equilibrium. For a supplier, the payoff as a function of b is:
Since this is differentiable and concave for all b r ≥ 0 (recall that we assume that the right derivative exists at b r = 0), the maximum occurs when the following conditions are satisfied:
To see this, note that when 0 < b r ≤ p, we have Π r (b r ) ≥ 0. If Π r (b r ) < 0 then we can increase Π r by infinitesimally decreasing b r (and on (0, p] we can always choose a smaller b r ). The first condition then follows. The second condition is derived analogously. Also observe that we can let b r ≤ p, since at b r > 0 supplier r will receive a negative payoff. Similarly, we can write the payoff of consumer q as a function of b q :
This is again concave by assumption, and the conditions are
Next, define b r = (1 − s r )λ and b q = d q λ. Then it can be checked that the equilibrium conditions above are satisfied with p = λ. We must have λ ≥ 0 because V q (d q ) ≥ 0 by assumption, and λ ≥ V q (d q ) for all q. Thus there exists a competitive equilibrium and it is an optimal solution to (OPT). Finally, suppose (b, p) is a competitive equilibrium. Then define s r = 1 − br p and d q = bq p . Then we can check that the KKT conditions are satisfied, and the allocation is an optimal solution to (OPT). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix B: The Existence of Nash Equilibria.
To prove Theorem 2 we show that the Nash equilibrium conditions obtained in Section 3 are exactly the necessary and sufficiency conditions for the following system.
By assumption, theV q andĈ r are differentiable and strictly concave and strictly convex, respectively. The KKT conditions for (NASH) then give:
where λ is the dual variable corresponding to the equality constraint. These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution. Since the objective function of (NASH) is strictly convex, the optimal solution is unique. We now claim that an optimal solution to (NASH) is a Nash equilibrium for the two-side proportional allocation mechanism. Recall that for these price-anticipators, a Nash equilibrium is a vector b ≥ 0 such that for every agent k = 1, ..., Q + R,
As before, define b q = d q λ and b r = (1 − s r )λ. Then one can check that the Nash equilibrium conditions are satisfied with p = λ. We must have λ ≥ 0 because V q (d q ) ≥ 0 by assumption and λ ≥ V q (d q ) for all q. There are at least two positive bids because otherwise the supply equals demand constraint of cannot be satisfied.
Conversely, we claims that any Nash equilibrium is an optimal solution to (NASH). To see this take any Nash equilibrium (b, p). Then define s r = 1 − So we have to solve the optimization problem (51)-(53). We will consider R as a parameter. At the minimum of (51), we will have either (54)
When (54) holds, we solve the following system:
Now set W = R − 1 and let g be the objective function (60). Thus
Differentiating we obtain
and this is strictly negative for any W, s. Therefore, the optimal value of s must occur at one of the boundaries of the feasible region. Since g is strictly decreasing in s, we must have s(1 + s/W ) = p. Thus it is enough to consider a variant of the second case (55) in which the inequality is no longer strict. Observe that the point at which the minimum of (56-59) is achieved is also part of the feasible region of the following new optimization problem:
Let f denote the objective function (60). We have
and at s = 1 this becomes ∂f ∂s
which is always positive since each term in the numerator is negative. But by the KKT conditions, ∂f /∂s must be negative at s = 1 if that point is the minimum, and therefore we must rule out that possibility. Similarly, when constraint (61) is tight, ∂f /∂s becomes ∂f ∂s
It can be checked that this is always negative. But, as before, if constraint (61) is tight at the minimum, ∂f /∂s must be positive, and we again have to rule out that possibility. Finally, we cannot have s → 0 at the minimum, since the objective function would go to one in that case. Thus, at the minimum, we have
Solving this equation for p, we find that
When we plug either p + or p − into the objective (60), we find (quite surprisingly) that the objective function reduces to the same simple expression in both cases. The optimization problem (60)-(63) thus becomes:
It is not hard to show that the objective function (64) is strictly increasing in s. The minimum value is thus achieved at the smallest feasible s. For condition (68) to be satisfied, we must have γ(s) ≥ 0. One can check that γ(s) has only one zero s * on [0, 1], with γ(s) ≥ 0 for s ≥ s * . Furthermore, at s * ,
and constraint (66) holds. Finally, one can check using a computer that (67) holds for all s. Since s * is the smallest feasible point in our domain, we conclude that the minimum is achieved at that point. This finally proves the main claim of Theorem 3.
Appendix D: Positive Marginal Costs at Zero.
Here we consider the case where C r (0) > 0 and show that the welfare ratio remains a constant provided C r (0) is bounded below one. Specifically, assume C r (s r ) = 1 2 β r s 2 r +γ r where 0 ≤ γ r ≤ 1. Then we can follow the original proof and find that the welfare ratio is the solution to the following problem:
where
As before, we have two cases to consider. First suppose 1 − γ ≥ β.
We claim that for any fixed γ < 1, the solution to this problem is strictly positive. First, we can drop the 1 2 p 1+s/(R−1) − γ 1 s term from the denominator, as this can only decrease the value of the objective function. We will also let R → ∞ in the numerator. The objective function then becomes
If there is a pair (p, s) that makes the objective function go to zero, it must satisfy
Observe that since s ≥ 0, we must have γ > p. But by the first constraint, we have p ≥ γ, a contradiction. So the point at which the objective function is outside our domain, and since that set is closed, we also cannot get arbitrarily close to that point.
Suppose now
1−γ β < 1. Then the optimization problem is
and the denominator can be rewritten as
1+s/(R−1) − γ If the objective function goes to zero, then either the denominator goes to infinity, which can only happen when β ↓ 0, or when the numerator goes to zero. The first case cannot occur because of the 1 − γ < β constraint. The second case can be treated like above: if the numerator is zero, we must have s = 2(1 − p) 2 γ − p which implies γ > p, but from the 0 < 1 − γ < β constraint we get that p > γ.
Appendix E: Constant Marginal Cost Functions and Total Welfare Loss.
Here we show that if the marginal costs are constant then the welfare ratio tends to zero. Consider linear valuation and cost functions with slopes α q and β r , respectively,
The bids corresponding to this allocation at a Nash equilibrium can then be defined according to the equilibrium conditions developed in Section 3. We will parametrize the allocations and the functions by a variable 0 < x < 1 and then let x → 0. So, let
s r and that 0 < s r < 1 and d q > 0. This shows the above allocation is a feasible solution to (NASH). Next we will show that the KKT conditions hold at (s, d) with λ = µ. This will imply that the allocation (s, d) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. We have
For the firms, we have
Thus the KKT conditions are satisfied, and so these allocations form a Nash equilibrium.
The expression for the welfare ratio can be written as
This equality holds because every supplier r that has s N E r > 0 has a slope β r < 1. To see this, observe that by the KKT conditions, whenever d q > 0,
and recall that µ < 1. Also, if β r ≥ 1, that supplier will not produce anything (neither at the Nash equilibrium nor at the optimal solution). So, without loss of generality, we can remove that supplier away and, thus, consider only the cases where β r < 1. Since for any supplier the marginal cost of producing one unit is always less than one, in an optimal solution everyone produces s r = 1 and gives it to the consumer with slope α 1 = 1. Now putting our definitions in the formula, we obtain:
The result follows by simply letting x → 0. 
The optimization problem is:
We can lower bound the objective function by setting the denominator to one. We can also let R → ∞ in the objective function. Then the objective function becomes
ps and the only way this can go to zero is if s → 0, p → 1. But it's not hard to see that for any d, this is impossible by the first constraint. Suppose now that 1/β < 1. The optimization problem is:
This goes to zero either when the denominator goes to infinity, which can only happen when β ↓ 0, or when the numerator goes to zero. The first case cannot occur because of the 1 < β constraint. The second case can be treated as above. A welfare ratio of Ω(
can then easily be shown.
Appendix G: Extension to Networks and Arbitrary Markets.
The case of consumers and suppliers simultaneously competing over a single link can be naturally extended to the case of a network of links. This network model is based upon the work of [3] . We will model the network as a graph G = (V, E) with L edges, called links. There are Q users, each characterized by a source-target pair of nodes s q , t q ∈ V , q = 1, ..., Q, as well as R providers, each capable of providing service over a subset L r of links l 1 , ..., l Lr , where r = 1, ..., R. Each consumer wishes to send flow from its source to its target. For this reason, we define P to be the set of paths in the graph G, and we say that a path p ∈ P belongs to q ∈ Q (denoted p ∈ q) when p connects s q , t q . We assume without loss of generality that each path belongs to only one q. If some path p k is shared by q 1 and q 2 , then we simply define two paths p q 1 , p q 2 in P that contain the same links.
Furthermore, we let f qp denote the flow that consumer q sends over the path p, and let f q = p∈q f qp = p∈q f p denote the total flow sent by q. In the last equality, f p is the total flow on path p, and we have f p = f pq since path p only belongs to consumer q. Each consumer has a valuation function V q and receives a value of V q (f q ) for sending a flow of f q .
We will make the following assumption on the valuation functions:
Assumption 3. For all q, the valuation functions V q (f q ) : R + → R + are strictly increasing and concave. Over f q > 0, the functions are differentiable. At f q = 0, the right derivative exists, and is denoted V q (0).
In turn, each producer r can supply bandwidth at a subset L r of the network links, and we denote this l ∈ r for l ∈ L r . We also assume that the costs of providing bandwidth at one link are independent of the costs at any other link. Formally, each producer r has |L r | cost functions C rl , l = 1, ..., |L r | satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption 4. For all r, l, there exists a continuous, convex, and strictly increasing function p rl (t) : R + → R + such that p rl (0) = 0, and for all s rl ≥ 0 we have:
and for s rl ∈ (−∞, 0) we have C rl (s rl ) = 0. The cost functions C rl : R → R + are thus continuous, strictly convex, strictly increasing, and differentiable over their entire domain.
Let s rl be the bandwidth supplied by producer r at link l ∈ L r , and let s r = (s r1 , ..., s r|Lr| ) be the corresponding vector. The total cost to r is then defined to be C r (s r ) = l∈Lr C rl (s rl ).
The social objective in this model is again to allocate flow and supply allocation so as to maximize the aggregate surplus. Formally, we want to come as close as possible to the result of the following optimization problem:
Definition of the Mechanism. Consumers and suppliers now submit vectors of bids w q and w r (respectively). We define w q := (w q1 , ..., w q|L| ) where w ql is the bid to link l. The vector w r is defined in the same way. The collection of all the bids is denoted w = (w 1 , ..., w Q , w Q+1 , . .., w Q+R ).
At each link l, a consumer q's bid selects a demand function of the form
and producer r's bid selects a supply function of the form
Then at each link, the mechanism then sets a price µ l (w l ) that clears the market by setting the price to µ l (w l ) = q:l∈q w ql + r:l∈r w rl R l where R l is the number of producers competing at link l.
Consumer q then gets allocated a capacity of c ql , and pays for it µ l c ql , while producer r provides s rl units of bandwidth and receives a payment of µ l s rl .
Once all capacities have been allocated, consumer q solves a max-flow problem on G with edge capacities set to c ql , and with the source and target being s q and t q . Hence we have
This mechanism induces a game where the payoff to consumer q is Existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition. A game is said to be concave if the following holds:
(1) Every joint strategy, viewed as a point in the product space of the individual strategy spaces, lies in a convex, closed, and bounded region R in the product space. (2) Each player's payoff function is continuous and concave in its own strategy.
Theorem 11. (Rosen [13] ) Every concave n-person game has an equilibrium point.
We now apply this to show that a Nash equilibrium exists in our game.
Theorem 12. The extended resource allocation game has a Nash Equilibrium Proof. We have to show that our game is concave.
First let's look at condition 1. Fix a consumer q, and a response vector w −q . By definition, w q ≥ 0. Also observe that π q (w q ; w −q ) ≤ π q (w q ; 0) for all w q . Also, since the allocation to q at link l is R l for any w ql > 0 as long as w −ql = 0, there is a W q s.t. for w q > W , π q (w q ; 0) < 0. Thus we can restrict without loss of generality the consumer bids on [0, W ] where W = max q W q .
The same thing can be shown for producers. Fix a producer r. Observe that
and the producer could profitably deviate to 0. It's not hard to apply this reasoning separately to each link, and deduce that we must have w rl ≤ R l C rl (s rl ) ∀l. This shows that we can assume without loss of generality that the payoffs are chosen within [0, M ] where M = max (max r,l RC rl (1), W ).
Next, we have to show that the payoffs are continuous and concave on our compact set. Observe that π q and π r are discontinuous when the response vectors w −q , w −r equal 0. For this reason, pick two producers r 1 and r 2 arbitrarily and restrict their strategy space to [ , M ] while keeping the other strategy spaces at [0, M ]. We will first show that the game resulting from this restriction is concave, and then we will explain why that restriction can be made without loss of generality.
Given the restriction, the payoffs π q and π r are continuous in w q , w r since the response vector is always non-zero. It is also straightforward to see that π r is continuous and concave in w r . To see that π q is continuous, observe that every function in the composition V q (f q (c q (w q ))), particularly the max-flow function, is continuous in w q . Also, since c q is continuous and f q is non-decreasing, we have that f q is concave. Then it follows straightforwardly that V q is concave in w q . By Rosen's theorem, we can then conclude that a Nash Equilibrium exists.
The Welfare Bound.
Theorem 13. In the extended resource allocation game, we have
where s is the unique positive root of the polynomial
This value can be numerically evaluated to approximately 0.588727. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
The idea is to first characterize the Nash equilibrium in terms of capacity allocations to consumers and supply allocations to producers. Then we can linearize the utilities like in a single-link case, and essentially set for each consumer a separate valuation function for each link. Doing so will reduce the extended game to |L| single-link games, to which we will apply our existing bound.
First, we need to show that given a response strategy w −q , for every capacity c ql there exists a bid w ql that ensures q gets that capacity. Lemma 14. The joint strategy w is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following holds:
1. At every link l, there are at least two suppliers r 1 , r 2 that have positive bids w r 1 , w r 2 . 2. For each q, Proof. Suppose w is a Nash equilibrium. The first claim follows as before. To establish the existence of w −1 , we observe that since w −q = 0, c ql (consumer q's capacity at link l) is a continuous function of w ql (consumer q's bid at link l). Furthermore, c ql (x, w −ql ) is strictly increasing in x, c ql (0, w −ql ) = 0, and lim x→∞ c ql (x, w −ql ) = ∞. It then follows that w −1 exists. If w q is part of a Nash equilibrium, then by definition we must have
The second claim follows from this fact. Suppose that it does not hold. Then, given w −q , there is ac that results in a higher payoff. But then using the functions w −1
ql we can find a vector of bids that will result in a higher value for π q , which is a contradiction.
Finally the third claim holds by definition of a Nash equilibrium. The other side of the implication can be established by reversing the argument above.
Since V q is composed with the max-flow function, which may not be differentiable, we need to use the following tools from convex analysis.
Definition. We say that γ is a subgradient of a convex function f : R n → R at x 0 if for all x ∈ R n we have
The set of all subgradients of f at x 0 is called the subdifferential and is denoted ∂(f (x 0 )). The supergradient and the superdifferential are the equivalents of a subgradient and a subdifferential for a concave function.
Lemma 15. Let w be a Nash equilibrium. Then for every consumer q there exists a vector α q such that the linearized valuation function
satisfies the following relationship:
In other words, w q is also a Nash equilibrium for the game where V q has been replaced byV q . Moreover, the payoffs at w in the new game remain the same.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that V q (c q ) is a convex function of c q ∈ R |L| by extending it appropriately to the entire domain. Also observe that c ql = w ql /µ(w l ) is concave in w ql , which implies that w −1 ql (c ql , w −ql ) is convex. Recall that the payoff to q as a function of its allocated capacities is
and it is concave. Then by the properties of subdifferentials we have
The addition here is defined over sets:
From condition 2 in Lemma 14, it follows that 0 ∈ ∂(−π q (c q , w −q )), and from the property above we can deduce that there exist vectors α q ∈ ∂(−V q (c q )) and β ql ∈ ∂(w
To show that (72) holds, it is enough to show that 0 is a supergradient of
As before we have
Since we still have α q ∈ ∂(−V q (c q )) and β ql ∈ ∂(w −1
ql (c ql , w −ql )), it must be that 0 ∈ ∂(−π q (c q , w −q )).
Now we can prove the main result
Proof. (of Theorem 13) We will first show that when each consumer has a linearized valuation functionV q (c), the extended game reduces to |L| single link games, to which the bound can be independently applied. Then we will prove that the price of anarchy of the game with linearized valuation functions is a lower bound for the price of anarchy with regular valuation functions, and thus establish our claim. By Lemma 15, we know that if w is a Nash equilibrium, then
and therefore
For all the suppliers serving link l, we have from part 3 of Lemma 14
q:l∈q w ql + r:l∈r w rl Thus the vector of bids w l is a Nash equilibrium of a simple single-link game and
where ϕ is the bound defined in the theorem. Now we can use this to bound the price of anarchy of the extended game. We have
In the first inequality we used the fact thatV
In the following equality the utilities and cost were expanded according to their definitions, and on the third line we inversed the order of summation. Finally, in the last inequality we used our existing bound |L| times.
Appendix H: An Optimal Smooth Market-Clearing Mechanisms.
Here we modify the arguments of [3] and [6] to show the proportional allocation mechanism is optimal within a class of mechanisms. First, we will present a formal definition of the general type of mechanisms that we consider. We will again call the vector of bids w.
Definition. A smooth two-sided market-clearing mechanism is a tuple of functions (D, S), D : (0, ∞) × [0, ∞) → R, S : (0, ∞) × [0, ∞) → R such that for all Q, R, and for all w ∈ R Q+R , w = 0, w ≥ 0, there exists a unique p > 0 that satisfies the following equation
We denote it as p(w). Each consumer receives an allocation of D(p, w q ) and pays pD(p, w q ) to the mechanism. Each supplier produces S(p, w q ) and receives in return a payment pS(p, w q ). The payoff to consumer q with valuation function V q is
while the payoff to supplier r with cost function C r is
Finally, if w = 0, the payoff to any consumer and any supplier is −∞.
We will restrict valuation functions to the following class.
Definition. The set U constains all valuation functions U (d) : R + → R + that are strictly increasing and concave over d ≥ 0. Over d > 0, the functions are differentiable, and at d = 0, the right derivative exists, and is denoted U (0).
Similarly, we restrict our attention to the following class of cost functions Definition. The set C contains all cost functions C(s) : R → R + of the form
where p(t) : R + → R + is a continuous and strictly increasing function, and p(0) ≥ 0. The class C conv ⊆ C contains all cost functions such that p(t) is also convex and p(0) = 0.
Observe that the class C is more general than what we had before since we no longer require that p() be convex and that p(0) = 0.
The next definition defines the class of mechanisms among which we will derive the optimality of our mechanism.
Definition. The class M contains all smooth two-sided market-clearing mechanisms (D, S) ∈ M that satisfy the following criteria:
(i) For all U ∈ U, the payoff to a consumer with valuation function U is concave when the consumer is price taking. That is, for all p > 0, U ∈ U, the function
is concave for w ≥ 0. Similarly, for all C ∈ C, the payoff to a producer with cost function C is concave when the consumer is price taking. That is, for all p > 0, C ∈ C, the function
is concave for w ≥ 0.
(ii) For all Q, R ≥ 1, and for any Q consumers with valuation functions V 1 , ..., V Q ∈ U, and for any R suppliers with cost functions C 1 , ..., C r ∈ C, each consumer's and each supplier's payoff when they are price anticipating is concave. That is, for each i = 1, ..., Q and each response vector w −i , the function
is concave. (By w we denote the joint strategy vector (w q , w −i ).) Also, for each j = 1, ..., R and each response vector w −i , the function
is concave. 
The first four criteria are a straightforward generalization of the classes of mechanisms studied in the fixed demand and fixed supply cases. The fifth criterion is a symmetry condition. Roughly, it states that both sides of the market should use the same kind of demand and supply functions. Optimal demand and supply functions for one-sided markets are indeed symmetric, and it is reasonable to give both market sides the same power to express their preferences; hence this condition is not unnatural. However, we leave open the question of whether better efficiency guarantees exist for assymetric markets. Finally, we define the optimal allocation to be the optimal solution to the following system:
Identifying the form that mechanisms in M can have. In this part, we will not use the symmetry assumption on M. First, we start by establishing that the demand and supply functions must be affine. Proof. We will show that when a(p) = 0, we can construct a competitive equilibrium at which some bids must necessarily be negative.
Suppose ∃p such that a(p) = 0. Let there be Q suppliers and R producers. Choose the Q allocations such that for all i = 1, ..., Q we have 0 < d q < a(p), and choose the R supply allocations so that supply equals demand.
Then choose the utilities and costs such that this allocation is optimal. The valuation functions should be strictly concave with U q (d q ) = p, and the cost functions should be chosen so that C r (s r ) = p (recall that they are strictly convex by assumption).
Observe that these allocations are an optimal solution to (72) (in particular, they satisfy the optimality conditions given in a previous document with Lagrangian variable p). Because of the strict concavity and convexity assumptions we made, this solution is unique. Now let w be a competitive equilibrium with the utilities and cost functions we just defined. Let µ be the price at that equilibrium. By (i), it exists for every p, and by #4 it must be optimal. Since the solution to (72) is unique, we must have D(µ, w) = d q . By our assumptions on the convexity, and the KKT theorems, the dual variables must also be unique and so µ = p.
But then observe that for consumer q,
where the inequality follows from our initial definition of d q . This can only hold when w q < 0, but this is prohibited by assumption, and so we have the contradiction we wanted to obtain.
The next lemma shows we can similarly fix the value of c(p) in the definition of S(p, w) to a scalar. Proof. The proof in the same spirit as that of the previous lemma. We will show that if c(p) < K * , then we can define a competitive equilibrium where some of the bids must be negative.
Suppose there is a p such that c(p) < K * . Let Q, R > 1, let s r be such that c(p) < s r < K * and s r > 0, and let d q be such that demand matches supply. Let the V q be strictly concave with V q (d q ) = p and let C r be such that C r (s r ) = p. Like before, this is an optimal solution to (72).
Then let w be a competitive equilibrium with the same utilities and costs. Like in the last proof, S(µ, w r ) = s r and µ, the price at the competitive equilibrium, must equal p.
But then for consumer r we have
and again this can only hold if w r < 0.
This concludes the results of this part. We have shown that all the mechanisms in M must have the form
and if we use our symmetry assumption, then b(p) = d(p). Finally, observe that if we divide S(p, w) by K * , the resulting mechanism is still in M, so from now on we will assume without loss of generality that S(p, w) is of the form
An Optimality Result. In this part we will adapt the optimality argument for Kelly's mechanism to our case. The main result is this theorem:
Theorem 20. Out of all smooth two-sided market-clearing mechanisms (D, S) ∈ M, the proportional allocation mechanism achieves the best possible welfare ratio in the game with Q > 1 consumers with utilities V 1 , ..., V Q ∈ U and R > 1 suppliers with costs C 1 , ..., C r ∈ C conv .
The first step is to express b(p(w)), d(p(w)) as a function of w. When supply matches demand, we have
w r On the third line we used our symmetry assumption. From that it follows that
We will also use the following function:
Since p is assumed to be uniquely defined for all w, there must exist an inverse function φ : (0, ∞) → (0, ∞) such that B(x) = y if and only if φ(y) = x. Thus Proof. Surjectivity holds because p(w) can clearly take any value p > 0 (by the definition (73) and the fact that the bids can take any value).
Differentiability of φ follows from the differentiability of b, which in turns follows from the differentiability of D and S.
Convexity is proved using #2 in Definition 4. First observe that since
must be concave, p(w)D(p(w), w q ) must be convex, since otherwise we can pick V q = α q d q for a very small α q and obtain a contradiction. But
and when w −i = 0, this becomes
implying that φ is indeed convex.
Our next step is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium, given a mechanism (D, S) ∈ M.
Lemma 22. Let (D, S) ∈ M, R, Q > 1 and V 1 , ..., V Q ∈ U, C 1 , ..., C r ∈ C. A vector w is a Nash equilibrium if and only if at least two components of w are non-zero, and there exist a non-zero vectors d, s ≥ 0 and a scalar µ > 0 such that w q = µd q , w r = µs r , q d q = r s r and the following conditions hold for consumers:
and the following conditions hold for suppliers:
Proof. Suppose w is a Nash equilibrium. Since the payoffs are all −∞ when w = 0, we must have w = 0. If less than two components of w are non-zero, then, as before, we may show that there is no Nash equilibrium.
So suppose w = 0 and at least two componnents are positive. Then all the payoffs are differentiable in the user's bid, and so the following conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium. For a consumer:
For a supplier:
After substituting µ = ( q w q + r w r )/R, d q = w q /µ, s r = w r /µ we get the conditions in the theorem.
For the other side of the implication, we simply reverse the argument above.
Now we can start proving the main theorem applying similar arguments to before. Let (D, S) ∈ M be fixed. This also fixes a function φ. As before, the worst case welfare ratio corresponds to
subject to the conditions for a Nash equilibrium. Since we assume V q ∈ U and C r ∈ C conv we can linearize the utilities and the marginal cost functions and instead consider the following optimization problem:
The Nash equilibrium conditions are those that we derived in Lemma 11.
We now use the same technique as before. It is possible to show that (75-76) hold with equality, and so we rewrite these equalities as As before, we can argue that the worst case occurs when Q → ∞. Therefore, after inserting the expression for d q into (74) we can take the limit as Q → ∞ and finally obtain the following reduced optimization problem: Constraint (85) can be derived as before (if φ(µ) > α 1 , then d q = 0 ∀q). Also observe that when we let φ(µ) = µ, this reduces to one of the optimization problems before. Now arguing as in that proof, we can show that constraints (83-84) must hold with equality, and so we have In (88), we consider ψ(µ) to be a fixed function of µ, and φ is a variable over which we are minimizing the objective function.
Observe also that since φ(µ) is convex, ψ(µ) ≥ 1. When φ(µ) is linear, ψ(µ) = 1 for all µ, and the (88) reduces to the function we had when deriving the bound. Recall that in that case s OP T = 1, because the objective function was strictly increasing in s when s OP T = 1/β. The same argument can be applied here, so let's assume without loss of generality that s OP T = 1.
Then the system becomes min Here we see why the supply functions must be bounded above. Specifically, we have the following result.
Theorem 23. Let S(w r , w −j ) be a continuous scalar-based market mechanism for the supply side of a two-sided market, and let r denote a supplier. Suppose that for all r we have: (1) for all s > 0, w −j , there is a bid w s such that S(w s , w −j ) = s; (2) the payoff to r is π r = ps r − C r (s r ) (3) the efficiency is calculated for a class of functions C such that C ∈ C =⇒ αC ∈ C for all α > 0, and that every C ∈ C is bijective, continuous, and lim s→∞ C r (s) = ∞; (4) There exists a competitive equilibrium s > 0 for some p > 0; (5) the efficiency at a competitive equilibrium is not worse than the efficiency at a Nash equilibrium. Then the welfare ratio (price of anarchy) has to be zero. Proof. Let s > 0 be a vector of competitive equilibrium allocations with price p > 0, let be r denote a supplier with cost function C r . Since s r = 0 for all r, we must have dπ r ds r = p − C r (s r (1/α) → ∞, 1/α → ∞ and the efficiency at the competitive equilibrium goes to zero. Since the efficiency at a Nash equilibrium was assumed to be at least as bad, it also goes to zero.
There are many very natural and elegant mechanisms that fall into this category. One is the usual Cournot mechanism: suppliers' bids are their outputs, and consumers' bids are their payment. Then each consumer receives a fraction of the total supply that is equal to the fraction of money he contributed, and each supplier's payment is handled similarly. This has zero efficiency.
Another example is when consumers choose parametrized demand functions D(p, θ) = θ/p and suppliers choose supply functions S(θ, p) = θp. Then p = q θ q / r θ r , the total amount produced is q θ q r θ r , and each consumer receives θ q / q θ q of the total quantity produced (and pays θ q ), while each supplier produces θ r / r θ r of the total amount.
